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Family law and national culture
Arguing against the cultural constraints argument
Masha Antokolskaia*
Introduction
‘Family laws are embedded in unique and cherished national cultural heritages of particular
countries’ – this is the core of the so-called ‘cultural constraints argument’.1 The ‘Cultural
constraints argument’ further suggests that this cultural and historical diversity is unbridgeable
and therefore family laws are not spontaneously converging and cannot be deliberately harmo-
nised. Otto Kahn-Freund reflected upon the common negative attitude towards the harmonisation
of family law, by proclaiming the unification of family law ‘a hopeless quest’.2 This scepticism
was rooted in the alleged fundamental unsuitability of family law for harmonisation due to the
strong cultural and historical constraints, resulting in the lack of shared values and objectives.
The notion of the cultural and historical embedment of family law originates from family law
scholars. As early as in the 1968, Wolfram Müller-Freienfels wrote, ‘family law concepts are
especially open to influence by moral, religious, political and psychological factors; family law
tends to become introverted because historical, racial, social and religious considerations differ
according to country and produce different family law systems’.3 Most scholars engaged in
harmonisation activities in other areas of private law have rather uncritically adopted the same
attitude. Even the political institutions of the EU have been susceptible to this assumption. For
instance, the European Council has quite recently stated that family law is ‘very heavily influ-
enced by the culture and tradition of national (or even religious) legal systems, which could
create a number of difficulties in the context of harmonisation’.4 
Accordingly, family law has for quite some time been regarded as unsuitable for deliberate
harmonisation, without substantial scrutiny of the merits of the cultural constraints argument.5
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6 Rather illustrative in this respect is a remark by Ole Lando, the ‘father’ of the first harmonisation project, made in 2006: ‘The family laws
of the European Union are a fascinating subject. One would think that each of the laws reflect the national character, the dominant religion,
the tradition, the family matters, which are linked to the economic and social conditions of each country. For these reasons I thought that there
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11 The introduction in Belgian family law of the notion of mater semper certa est, is used as an example thereof, pp. 785-794. W. Pintens &
C. Vanwinckelen, Casebook European Family Law, 2001, p. 15.
12 G.-R. de Groot, ‘Op weg naar een Europees personen- en familierecht?’, 1995 Ars Aequi, no.1, p. 29.
13 See for instance Pintens & Vanwinckelen, supra note 11, p. 15: ‘(…) law, even if imbedded in our culture, is primarily an instrument to
regularize human relationships and is not a purpose in itself.’
14 M. Antokolskaia et al., Naar een Europees Familierecht, Report for the Netherlands Comparative law Association,1999.
15 This study, financed by the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences and Arts, resulted in a monograph Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe:
A Historical Perspective. A Tale of Two Millennia, 2006.
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As a result, the issue of the harmonisation of family law has long remained on the fringes of the
discussion surrounding harmonisation of private law.6 
Nonetheless, since the late 1990s the attitude towards the harmonisation of family law has
become increasingly, albeit it gradually, more positive.7 The most tangible result of this develop-
ment was the establishment of the Commission on European Family Law (CEFL) in 2001, aimed
at elaborating non-binding Principles for family law in Europe. However, in spite of the growing
amount of literature8 and the thriving drafting activities of the CEFL, harmonisation of family
law remains a highly controversial issue and the discussion whether it is at all possible is far from
being closed case.9 The reason for this is that the cultural constraints argument has not been
overcome, but rather circumvented.
The notion that family law is strongly embedded in national culture has long been taken
for granted without having been analysed thoroughly by either proponents or opponents of the
cultural constraints argument. Even those who try to put this argument into perspective have not
investigated it in any depth. The most common counter-argument is that certain peculiarities of
the family law of the country in question cannot be explained by cultural factors. For instance,
Ewoud Hondius doubts that the fact that The Netherlands is the only European country that still
has a total community of assets as the legal regime for matrimonial property could be explained
by the particularities of Dutch national culture.10 Others point out that certain changes in long-
standing family law concepts have not brought about any cultural shocks.11 The most elaborate
criticism thus far is that some culturally-imbedded rules do not coincide with the modern notion
of human rights;12 that tradition is not ‘holy’ and should not be protected at any rate; and that
even culturally-laden family rules are not an end in themselves, but rather a means by which to
promote a desired regulation of human relations.13 
In my earlier work14 I tried to make a first step in the direction of a more fundamental
qualification of the cultural constraints argument, by bringing to light the common historical
roots of family law that all European countries have in common. This endeavour inspired me to
undertake a five-year study into the convergence and divergence of family law in Europe.15 I was
challenged by the idea of exploring the main objection to family law harmonisation, the so-called
‘cultural constraints argument’. This study revealed that the ‘cultural constraints argument’ has
a number of various dimensions. In this article, I will summarise my findings regarding one of
its core dimensions: the cultural embedment of family law.
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16 S. Hicks, ‘A Model of Society for the Comparative Study of Law’, in Monismus oder Pluralismus der Rechtskulturen? Proceedings of the
13th World Congress, Rechtstheorie, 1997, p. 215.
17 Legrand speaks in this sense of the ‘Frenchness’ of French law. P. Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture, 1999, p. 5. 
18 L. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, 1975, p. 199.
19 R. Cotterrell, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’, in D. Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures, 1997, p. 20.
20 L. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority and Culture, 1990, p. 213.
21 L. Friedman, Total Justice, 1985, p. 98.
22 On this and other aspects of multiculturalism see: E. Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law. Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-first
Century, 2004, pp. 123-132.
23 M. Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law, 1972, p. 195.
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1. Is family law embedded in unique national culture?
The assumptions constituting the cultural constraints argument can be summarised as follows.
Firstly, it is suggested that laws are ingrained in the culture of the countries in which they
operate. Secondly, it is assumed that each country has its own particular national culture that
influences the respective law. Thirdly, it is presupposed that each of these national cultures is
unique to the country concerned and that these national cultures are not moving any closer to one
another. The final reckoning is that due to their embedment in the unique national cultures, laws
are not converging spontaneously and cannot be harmonised deliberately. 
Culture can be defined in many different ways. A general definition of culture could be that
it is the ‘heritage of art, science and ideas’.16 The issue is to what extent such heritage should be
considered ‘national’ when it comes to the elements that are relevant to family law. Pierre
Legrand and many others clearly perceive the ‘cultureness’ of law from a national perspective.17
Laurence Friedman, for instance, has extensively explored the concept of ‘legal culture’ and
tends to believe that each country has its unique particular culture.18 
1.1. Are national family cultures internally homogeneous?
The first relevant issue is to what extent the national cultures within Europe are internally
homogenous. It is has rightly been noted that the culture of a given country ‘may be understood
as a vast diversity of overlapping cultures; some relatively local, some, more universal’.19
Laurence Friedman speaks in this respect of ‘a dazzling array of cultures’ within a single
culture 20 One of the important points of distinction between these sub-cultures is their ideologi-
cal affiliation. Thus, Friedman delineates the conservative culture and the liberal culture and ‘all
sorts of variants and subgroups’ between them.21 
This internal cultural diversity is especially manifest in family ideology and the discourse
on family legislation. Ever since the Enlightenment, an ideological conservative/progressive
discord has divided political life in Europe. All ideological trends since the Enlightenment, such
as the Restoration, nineteenth century liberalism, socialism, feminism etc., are of a pan-European
nature. All these trends generated their own sets of values with regard to family and family law.
The corresponding progressive-conservative dichotomy does not coincide with State boundaries,
but is instead prevalent in every European country. This does not refer to the growing multi-
culturalism resulting from immigration from non-European countries.22 What is meant is that the
innate population in each particular European country is split into various different ‘cultures’ that
are affiliated to corresponding ideologies. A clear example is France. Max Rheinstein noticed that
since the 1789 Revolution, France has been split up into ‘les deux Frances’, a progressive France
and a conservative France, and has shown how much the subsequent history of French family law
has been  affected by the struggle between those two camps.23 Describing the 1975 reform of
French divorce law, Mary Ann Glendon concludes that at the end of the twentieth century French
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24 M.A. Glendon, ‘The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976’, 1976 The American Journal of Comparative Law, p. 201.
25 V. Pocar & P. Ronfani, ‘Family Law in Italy: Legislative Innovations and Social Change’, 1978 Law and Society Review, no. 4, p. 629.
26 F. Rothenbacher, ‘Social Change in Europe and its Impact on Family Structures’, in J. Eekelaar & T. Nhlapo, The Changing Family:
International Perspectives on the Family and Family Law, 1998, p. 21.
27 I am indebted to Esin Örücü for this term. See her E. Örücü, Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in
Transition. Report for the Netherlands Comparative law Association, 1999, p. 86.
28 See for instance: M. Dillon, Debating Divorce. Moral Conflict in Ireland, 1993.
29 C. James, ‘Cead Mile Failte. Ireland Welcomes Divorce: The 1995 Irish Divorce Referendum and the Family (Divorce) Act of 1996’, 1997
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 8, no. 1, p. 175.
30 As Will Kymlicka has noted, ‘the state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others’. W. Kymlicka,
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, 1995, p. 108.
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society was still divided into the same ‘les deux Frances’.24 Italy is also a good example. As
Valerio Pocar and Paola Ronfani have stated: ‘It is important to remember that Italy today still
presents major contrasts in culture and daily usage between industrialized zones and those with
a predominantly agricultural economy, between town and country, between North and South. As
result there are many different family structures, which cannot be integrated into a single abstract
model. The same consideration applies to the whole discourse on family legislation.’25 
Everywhere in Europe, the modernity of family patterns and family culture differs greatly
from one social environment to another. The ideas that a highly educated, urban family of young
professionals have about family and family law, differ significantly from the corresponding ideas
of a rural family of middle-aged traditional farmers in any European country, be it Italy, Sweden,
Malta or The Netherlands. Franz Rothenbacher concisely labelled this phenomenon ‘the con-
temporaneity of the noncontemporaneous’.26 Each country has, of course, a predominant ideology
regarding family law matters, which is generally the ideas of the majority of the population or
the élites dirigeante.27 Thus the pertinent family law is either a reflection of the predominant
values of the majority, or a compromise between the values of the various groups.
Sometimes the ongoing struggle between the conservative and progressive ‘cultures’ in the
field of family law reaches the point of ideological confrontation. The Irish and Italian divorce
referendums are good illustrations of this phenomenon.28 The history of family law reform shows
that most confrontations finally result in compromise legislation. Only every now and then is one
side able to clearly overpower the other. For example, the conservatives did manage to turn back
the clock with the abolition of divorce in France after the Restoration in 1816 and in Spain under
Franco in 1939. More often it is the progressive side that manages to achieve a certain break-
through, for example with the introduction of divorce on demand in Sweden and Spain, and
same-sex marriage in The Netherlands, Belgium and Spain.
It is worth noting that there is an objective difference between ‘conservative’ and ‘progres-
sive’ family law that is relevant here. Family law built upon a conservative ‘culture’ is often
rather restrictive. Population groups representing minority ‘cultures’ are also subjected to the
restrictions of that law, although they do not share its underlying convictions. A good example
is the first Irish divorce referendum of 1986, when 63.5% of the electorate voted against the
introduction of divorce and 36.5% voted in favour.29 As the legal possibility to obtain a divorce
does not compel anyone to divorce, the result of the referendum meant that the majority of the
Irish population denied not only themselves, but also the dissenting minority the right to dissolve
their marriage. Therefore, these minorities often have the feeling that their rights are being
infringed upon in an undemocratic manner.30 Such is also the in the infamous Johnston case,
where the plaintiffs maintained that the impossibility of obtaining a divorce in Ireland infringed
upon their right to family life and the right to marry – protected under Articles 8 and 12 of the
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31 See: Johnston and others v. Ireland, ECtHR, Judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A, No. 112, and the dissenting opinion of Judge
De Mayer.
32 M. van Mourik, ‘Wettelijke en contractuele vormgeving van affectieve relaties,’ in Het familierecht in het perspectief van de 21e eeuw, 1999,
pp. 67-68.
33 It is worth noting here that in domestic debates the cultural constraints argument is by far more popular in the ‘conservative’ camp. Rodolfo
Sacco has mentioned that ‘The ideology of cultural self-sufficiency is merely the name given to the ideology of cultural delay’. R. Sacco,
‘Diversity and Uniformity in the Law’, 2001 The American Journal of Comparative Law, p. 177.
34 L. Friedman, Total Justice, 1985, p. 98.
35 Roger Cotterrell has rightly noticed that legal ideology is more strongly linked with social power than other elements of legal culture.
Cotterrell, supra note 19, p. 23.
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European Convention on Human Rights.31 Family law built upon a progressive ‘culture’,
however, is generally more permissive. This means that cultural groups representing a more
conservative ideology are left enough room to arrange their family life in their own way. They
have, of course, to accept the existence of permissive legislation, which is sometimes met with
difficulty. For instance, not everyone in The Netherlands was happy with the opening of civil
marriage to same-sex couples, as some felt that this also involved the deterioation of ‘their
marriage’.32 Still, providing more options for everyone is a relevant advantage of permissive law
above restrictive law in this ‘multicultural’ context. 
1.2. The pan-European character of national conservative and progressive ‘subcultures’
If one accepts that the culture of each particular country is not internally homogeneous, the
question arises to what extent the subcultures, in which national cultures are divided, are unique
to the countries concerned. Analysing family law history, allows one to draw the conclusion that
ever since the Enlightenment Europe has been split by the ideological discord between the
‘progressive’ camp (seeking modernisation of family law under the influence of the ideas of the
Enlightenment), and the ‘conservative’ camp (opposing this modernisation in the name of
‘traditional’ family values).33 The ‘subcultures’ relevant to family ideology and law generally
correspond with this divide. Both the ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ family ideologies are
clearly of a pan-European nature, since they both have their own rank and file in each European
country. Sometimes this is a majority, sometimes a tiny stratum. The countries with modern
family laws also have population groups with a conservative family ‘culture’ and the countries
with conservative family laws always have population groups that represent the most modern
views on family life. Laurence Friedman notices that adherents of specific attitudes ‘tend to
cohere, to hang together, to form clusters of related attitudes’.34 The members of the affiliated
cultural groups understand each other across the borders, often looking abroad to support their
ideas, and they repeatedly call on the European courts to adjudicate their confrontations with their
compatriot opponents.
Thus, the elements of national culture that are relevant to family law are, in general,
anything but unique. On the other hand, as the influence of different (sub)cultures varies from
country to country,35 national differences in prevailing family ideology and law certainly cannot
be disregarded. Yet, it seems clear that in the field of family ideology and law there are few
unique national cultures, but instead pan-European conservative and progressive cultures, and
a wealth of variety in between. There are of course all kinds of national peculiarities that
contribute to the rich cultural, ideological and political fabric that is Europe, but their significance
as a determinant of family policy and law pales into insignificance in light of the dominance of
pan-European conservative and progressive ideological trends.
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36 M.-T. Meulders-Klein, ‘Towards a European Civil Code of Family Law? Ends and Means’, in K. Boele-Woelki, (ed.), Perspectives for the
Unification and Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, 2003, p. 109.
37 For an overview see: D. Nelken, ‘Comparing Legal Cultures: An Introduction’, in D. Nelken, (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures, 1997, pp. 1-9.
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39 L. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, 1975, p. 223.
40 M. van Hoecke & M. Warrington, ‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model For Comparative Law,’
1998 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, p. 513.
41 Ibid., pp. 514-515.




2. Is family law embedded in unique national legal culture?
If the other elements of national culture that are relevant to family law are not, or at least not
predominantly, of a unique national character, the question arises whether perhaps legal culture
is. The proponents of the cultural constraints argument seldom directly refer to the embedment
of family law in culture in general. It more often suggested that family laws are embedded in one
particular element of culture, namely legal culture. Thus, Pierre Legrand speaks of the embed-
ment of law in a subjective component of legal culture: legal mentalité. Marie-Thérèse Meulders-
Klein suggests that family law constitutes the hard core of any legal culture.36 This reference to
legal, rather than general culture, allows the suggestion that, while general family ‘cultures’ are
not unique to particular European states, the legal cultures are. This possibility calls for some
inquiry into the notion of legal culture.
2.1. What is legal culture? Deep and surface levels of legal cultures
Legal culture is a particular element of general culture: a sort of translation of general culture into
the language of legal concepts, techniques and ideas. The issue of legal culture has received
substantial attention recently and a lot of literature has been devoted to the topic.37 I will confine
myself to only a few remarks. As was mentioned above, the concept of legal culture has been
extensively explored in various works of Laurence Friedman. Friedman defines legal culture as
‘ideas, attitudes, values and opinions about law, the legal system, and legal institutions of some
given population’.38 Within a legal culture Friedman primarily distinguishes between the
professional and the common (lay) legal culture.39 Mark van Hoecke and Mark Warrington
introduce the concept of ‘paradigm’ in order to describe the hard core of legal cultures more
specifically.40 To such ‘paradigmatical’ aspects of legal culture they attribute: (1) a concept of
law; (2) a theory of valid legal sources; (3) a methodology of law; (4) a theory of argumentation;
(5) a theory of legitimation of law; and (6) a common basic ideology.41 
Within those paradigms of legal culture, Van Hoecke and Warrington distinguish between
different levels. The ‘common ideology, common moral convictions form the deep level, which
eventually comes to dominate the other levels.’42 On the basis of this differentiation they further
distinguish between differences amongst legal cultures, which manifest themselves at the surface
and the deeper levels. The differences on the deep moral and ideological level are of paramount
importance. The differences on the surface level (for example legal rules, legal concepts and legal
techniques) are less important.43 It is justly pointed out that ‘once the moral choices have been
made, legal techniques are used in such a way as to reach the desired result.’44 In a similar way
Hugh Collins remarks with regard to the contemporary harmonisation activities, that technical
aspects of the differences in legal cultures are relatively easy to reconcile, while overcoming
differences, based on dissimilar moral values ‘encounter[s] a general tension between the project
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45 H. Collins, ‘European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States’, 1995 European Review of Private Law, p. 363.
46 Ibid.
47 See my Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A Historical Perspective, 2006.
48 L. Moccia has traced the historical routes of this ‘mental obsession with presumed division between Civil and Common law’ in the
‘oversimplified as well as nationalistically biased’ attitude that emerged, in L. Moccia, ‘Historical Overview of the Origins and Attitudes of
Comparative Law’, in B. Witte & C. de Forder (eds.), The common law of Europe and the future of legal education, 1992, pp. 611-619.
49 P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems Are Not Converging’, 1996 International and Comparative law Quarterly, p. 62.
50 P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’, 1997 Modern Law Review, p. 45.
51 For which he received a well-deserved acquisition of selective and tendentious ‘rétrodiction’ of legal history. A. Chamboredon, ‘The Debate
on a European Civil Code: For an “Open Texture”’, in M. van Hoecke & F. Ost (eds.), The Harmonisation of European Private Law, 2000,
p. 68.
52 P. Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture, 1999, pp. 83-84.
53 E.g. X. Lewis, ‘The Europeanisation of the Common Law’, in R. Jagtenberg et al. (eds.), Transfrontier Mobility of Law, 1995, pp. 47-61;
R. Zimmermann, ‘Roman Law and European Legal Unity’, in A. Hartkamp et al. (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, 1998, pp. 34-35;
J. Merryman, ‘On the Convergence (and Divergence) of Civil Law and Common Law’, in M. Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a
Common Law of Europe, 1978, pp. 195-233; B. Markesinis (ed.), The Gradual Convergence. Foreign Ideas Foreign Influences and English
Law on the Eve of the 21st Century, 1994.
54 B. Markesinis, ‘Learning from Europe and Learning in Europe’, in B. Markesinis (ed.), The Gradual Convergence. Foreign Ideas Foreign
Influences and English Law on the Eve of the 21st Century, 1994, p. 30.
55 Ibid.
56 See M. Antokolskaia, Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A Historical Perspective, 2006.
57 Merryman, supra note 53, p. 230.
58 Ibid., pp. 232-233.
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of harmonisation and respect for cultural diversity in Europe.’45 This proposition strongly applies
to family law, where almost every rule ‘represent[s] a symbolic endorsement of particular moral
ideas.’46 The emphasis on the political and ideological aspects of legal culture laid by Van
Hoecke, Warrington and Collins is narrowly related to the idea of the embedment of family law
in the political aspects of society, put forward by Otto Kahn-Freund and David Bradley and
amply supported by the results of the examinations in my aforementioned book.47
2.2. The legal cultures of common law and civil law 
According to Pierre Legrand, the most important differences between the legal cultures in Europe
lie across the axes of the common/civil law dichotomy.48 Legrand postulates an irreconcilable
discord between the civil law and the common law mentalités.49 He suggests that ‘there exist[s]
both [a] common law and [a] civil law mentalité – two different ways of thinking about the law,
about what it is to have knowledge of law and about the role of law in society’.50 Legrand
presents the history of the relationship between common and civil law systems as a kind of
perpetual ‘epistemological war’.51 Consequently, he resolutely denies any possibility of the
evolution of common and civil law cultures towards each other and claims that even evident
examples of growing proximity between legal solutions provided in civil and common law
systems should be dismissed as illusions based on a fallacious reduction of law to legal rules.52
In contrast to Legrand’s contentions, several authors53 assert that convergence of civil and
common law systems, albeit gradual and patchy,54 has taken place on various levels. Basil
Markesinis notes convergence on both the functional (similar solutions to similar problems) and
the formal level (for example, convergence in the sources law; and a growing rapprochement of
judicial views).55 My research has shown that there is not much difference between the common
law and civil law rules on marriage, divorce, cohabitation, the position of extramarital children,
and even matrimonial property.56 John Merryman has accurately pointed out that similarity of
rules alone ‘is in most cases an unreliable indicator of convergence or divergence of legal
systems.’57 Yet, even he admits that similar rules often provide ‘outward evidence of a deeper
legal similarity’. A ‘more convincing measure of convergence’ has to be found, according to
Merryman, ‘in the extent to which legal systems in Civil and Common Law nations play out the
fundamental values of Western culture.’58 Application of this criterion reveals that the common
MASHA ANTOKOLSKAIA
59 Ibid., p. 233.
60 Van Hoecke & Warrington, supra note 40, p. 501.
61 See M. Antokolskaia, Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe: A Historical Perspective, 2006.
62 Kahn-Freund, supra note 2, p. 150.
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and civil law families ‘are moving along parallel roads, towards the same destination.’59 Mark
van Hoecke and Mark Warrington conclude that ‘there are still differences between common law
and civil law, but they are very close to a point where there will no longer be paradigmatical
differences. What will ultimately remain is some degree of difference, although not of a funda-
mental nature.’60 
These conclusions apply all the more to family law. My research has made it clear that
there are no more differences on the level of legal ideology in respect of family laws, between
the common and civil law cultures than between the civil law countries internally.61 If one takes
as a starting point that legal ideology is the most important element in determining the differ-
ences and similarities between legal cultures, one must conclude that the alleged fundamental
difference between common and civil law legal cultures, whatever its merits for other fields of
law, does not apply to family law. The history of family law clearly shows that the choices that
were made in the context of family law reforms, and the political debates surrounding these
reforms, have always been and still very much are the same on the continent as on the British
Isles. Moreover, not only the ideological, but also the formal elements of legal culture in family
law are no different in common and civil law countries. The explanation for this is that the bulk
of family law in the whole of Western Europe, with the only notable exception being matrimonial
property law, is embedded in a common legal past: the medieval uniform canon law. The two
systems even share the same conceptual language. For a common law lawyer terms like ‘separa-
tion of bed and board’, ‘annulment’ or ‘illegitimate child’ sound as familiar as for his continental
colleague. There is not even much difference with respect to the legal sources, as even in the
common law countries family law is mainly an area of codified law.62
2.3. Conclusion
In the context of the cultural constraints argument, only differences in legal culture on the ‘deep’
level of legal ideology and moral convictions could be truly relevant, as differences on the
‘surface’ level of legal rules, concepts and techniques are relatively easy to overcome. Studying
the history of family law allows one to draw the conclusion that with respect to family law, the
general similarity at the level of ideologies and morals between all countries in Europe is
overwhelming. Due to the shared common past stemming from the application of medieval
uniform canon law, the differences on the ‘surface’ level are also less than in any other field of
private law. It is clear that the conclusions presented above in relation to the alleged fundamental
differences between the legal cultures of common law and civil law can also apply to the civil
law countries when compared to each other. The conclusion of this brief excursion into legal
culture is therefore that with regards family law, legal cultures in Europe do not possess a unique
national character, at least not in such a way that this should affect the conclusion previously
drawn with regards the other elements of national culture relevant to family law, namely that in
the field of family ideology and law, there is so such thing as a unique national culture, but rather
a pan-European conservative and a pan-European progressive culture, and a plethora of variety
in between.
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3. Is there a common European family culture?
The conclusion remains that the elements of national culture that are relevant to family law are
generally anything but unique. Modernisation goes on everywhere in Europe, albeit sometimes
at a very different pace, and both the driving and opposing forces that shape this evolution are
of a pan-European character. Does this mean that we can speak of a common European family
culture? 
The proponents of the cultural constraints argument firmly postulate the uniqueness of
national cultures, while their opponents tend to see the particularities of the national cultures
within Europe within the broader context of a common European culture. Even Laurence
Friedman, who generally believes in the uniqueness of national cultures,63 acknowledges the
existence of such general phenomenon as modern culture or the culture of modernity.64 Although
there is no definite agreement concerning the principal characteristics of the common European
culture, some characteristics thereof are more or less unambiguous. Such common features
include, for instance, individualism and rationalism,65 personalism and intellectualism,66 rights-
consciousness and dissolution of traditional authority,67 and respect for human rights. 
However, these are only very general characteristics. They are not enough to constitute a
general ideological consensus on particular issues of family law. As we have seen, on some of
those issues consensus does exist. The best examples are the above mentioned common ideologi-
cal standpoints on the equality of spouses and of children born in and outside of marriage. Yet,
it is abundantly clear that on many other issues such consensus does not exist. The consensus-
forming potential of the European human rights instruments and courts is limited by the fact that
they generally tend to go no further than the level of consensus that already exists among the
Member States. Therefore there is not much hope that in the near future a shared notion of
European human rights will form a basis of common ideology for the whole of family law.
The point is that the pan-European character of family law culture and ideology is most
evident if examined from a historical perspective, removed from any particular point in time.
However, if one considers the family law culture and ideology of the various countries of Europe
as they stand at a certain point in time only, it is the differences, rather than the similarities, that
tend to be most prominent. It was concluded above that these are caused merely by the differ-
ences in the pace and profundity of the modernisation of family law that takes place everywhere
in Europe. Yet it is clear that in the context of an evaluation of the cultural constraints argument,
the national differences in prevailing family culture and ideology that exist at present, and in one
form or another will most probably continue, and thus cannot be disregarded altogether. It is
therefore very plausible to speak of a common European family culture, but not in the sense that
the cultural constraints argument could be dismissed altogether because in reality there are no
relevant differences among the national family cultures and ideologies in Europe. Such differ-
ences are definitely present, and the analysis of convergence tendencies in the preceding sections




It is clear that the core assumption of the cultural constraints argument – the alleged embedment
of family laws in unique and unchangeable national cultures – cannot be maintained. History
plainly shows that in the field of family ideology and law one cannot really talk of unique
national cultures, but rather of a pan-European culture, which is not homogeneous but an
amalgamation of pan-European ‘conservative’ and pan-European ‘progressive’ cultures. The
relative influence of these two opposing family ‘cultures’ varies from country to country and
from time to time. Examinations of history of family law made in my aforementioned study
suggest that there are the differences in the balance of political power between ‘progressive’ and
‘conservative’ forces, rather than national culture that determines the pertinent family laws.
The cultural constraints argument cannot be saved by the suggestion that national politics
is just an element of national culture; this is not because such classification is impossible in
principle. Although a more precise description of the relationship between culture and politics
would of course depend on the adopted definition of both concepts, it seems obvious that national
culture can be considered an important determinant of the political affairs of a country, and
perhaps the same can be said of the reverse relationship. The cultural constraints argument cannot
be saved by such reasoning, because it is not so much the element of ‘culture’ that is essential
to it, but the elements of uniqueness and unchangeability. These are the elements that lie at the
heart of the assumption that convergence and deliberate harmonisation of national family laws
is impossible, not the contention that family law is determined by culture. As we have seen, the
political factor that is the main determinant of the evolution of national family law is the balance
of power between the local adherents of predominantly pan-European ‘progressive’ and ‘conserva-
tive’ family ideology. This balance of political power is obviously neither unique nor unchange-
able. On the contrary, there are few things so variable as the political vicissitudes of a country
and the outcome of democratic elections. Although one could of course say that a particular
country generally has a more or less continuous ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’ political character
(for instance, when comparing Malta to Sweden or Ireland to The Netherlands), the example of
Spain opening civil marriage to same-sex couples soon after the electoral victory of the social-
democrats under Rodríguez Zapatero is a clear example that the political determinants of the
evolution of family law are very changeable indeed. One never knows how long such a statement
will remain valid when it comes to family law.
All things considered, the conclusion can be none other than that the cultural constraints
argument is beyond redemption. Its core assumptions cannot be upheld. Family law is not so
much embedded in unique national culture and history, but rather in a pan-European culture and
history. Pertinent national family laws are determined by political, rather than cultural factors,
and these are fluid. Every now and then family laws do converge spontaneously. However, it
remains to be seen what all this means for the deliberate harmonisation of family law.
